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LA ARGENTINA AUSENTE* 
Juan Eugenio Corradi 
In a lecture on "The Present State of Fiction in Latin America," delivered 
in Norman, Oklahoma, in 1975, Julio Cortázar spoke in two voices. He ex-
empted the fantastic literature of the River Plate from social and cultural 
interpretations of the reductive kind. On this point I shall not dwell. I shall 
simply endorse it, and add: As a positive discipline, sociology seeks to extract 
a truth of some kind from literature, but literature wishes to subtract its truth 
from any discipline, and to lodge its claims elsewhere. As Cortázar implied, 
the issue then is not the relative difficulty or the possible success of a socio-
logical interpretation, but the manner in which literature ultimately triumphs 
over it, eschewing reduction, unsettling established truths, dissolving class-
ifications, annulling many a paradigm. Literature is the catastrophe of inter-
pretations. 
At the end of Cortázar's lecture, however, the writer seemed to imper-
sonate, or at least to solicit the aid of, the sociologist, as the writer cast a 
glance upon the horrors of real history, the history that includes both writer 
and sociologist, the history that requires interpretation and that demands parti-
cipation. In this role, with this other voice, Cortázar said: 
"... in contrast to a literature of the startling, which enriches us in 
the measure in which it accepts and cultivates a rupture with the 
excessive pragmatism of reality and reason, history does not 
seem ever to have received a dose of the fantastic without 
precipitating the worst catastrophes. [... ] Argentine history 
would seem to have consisted for many decades of orienting its 
mirrors towards impracticable European models [. .. ] In this 
way, many Argentines accepted an existence in which what was 
truly ours, from the color of our skin to our authentic language, 
was denied by a Europeani-zing education which made us 
uncertain and vulnerable. [. . . ] 
*Sections I through III of this paper were presented, in an earlier version, at 
the workshop on "The Rise of the New Latin American Narrative, 
1950-1975," at the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., October 18-20, 1979. 
Portions of this paper will appear in the Introduction to the book Argentina: 
The Second Peronist Era, edited by Juan Carlos Torre and Juan Eugenio 
Corradi, Philadelphia: ISHI Press, 1980. 
At present [... ] the house of cards has collapsed [... ] and we 
are witnessing in conditions which are almost always horrible, 
the anguished search for our identity, for our necessary and 
irreplaceable reality."* 
Sociology stands interpellated by this reflection, and it should respond 
by offering its own narrative of the pseudomorphic history to which Cortázar 
pointed. In the pages that follow, I propose a version of that narrative, an 
exercise in redescription accomplished with the tools of my craft, so as to 
join the writer, for at least part of the same way, in the search for that "nec-
essary and irreplaceable reality." Thus, I will not treat the Argentina that is, 
or is not, present in the literary text, but the sociological country that, 
roughly since Cortázar left it, in the fifties, has stumbled from one decade to 
the next, mostly absent from itself, into its present sorry predicament. 
The narrative that I propose is divided into four parts. The first explores 
the cultural malaise that seized middle-class society since the fifties and 
which gave rise to extreme forms of crisis behavior during the past decade. 
The second describes the failure of political solutions to the protracted social 
crisis, the erosion of legitimacy, the collapse of institutions, in short, the 
impossible governance of a volatile society. The third attempts to account for 
the weakness of social bonds and for the thinness of the moral fabric. 
Finally, the fourth portrays aspects of the terroristic order that has descended, 
like a frost, on Argentina. The early seventies, which mark the return of 
Peronism, will serve as a pivot for the narrative. The latter telescopes 
backwards to the fifties and forwards to the eighties. It is primarily 
concerned with the history of civil society during these decades, with its 
figures and its metaphors. 
*Julio Cortázar, "The Present State of Fiction in Latin America," in Jaime 
Alazraki and Ivar Ivask, eds., The Final Island. The Fiction of Julio 
Cortázar, Norman: Oklahoma, University of Oklahoma Press, 1976, p. 36. 
I 
Culture 
"... entrar escoba en mano en una casa sucia 
para limpiarle el polvo de mucha ignominia, de 
mucha hipocresía." 
Ultimo Round, II, 56 
"Para nosotros, digamos para la Joda, todas las 
armas eficaces son válidas porque sabemos que 
tenemos razón y que estamos acorralados por 
dentro y por fuera, por los gorilas y los yanquis o 
incluso por la pasividad de esos millones que 
esperan siempre que otros saquen las castañas del 
fuego." 
Libro de Manuel, 262 
A landslide majority carried Juan Perón from exile back to power in 
1973. Given a chance to express their views freely after a long period of inter-
diction and chicanery, Argentines opted for the wholesale rejection of the 
previous eighteen years, and put their hopes once again on the old líder. As a 
balance of a whole epoch of military coups and civilian administrations, the 
results of those elections were resounding and conclusive. This near-plebiscite 
also discharged on the political arena a torrent of old and new frustrations 
developed over the erratic and dammed-up course followed by Argenina since 
1955. 
A collective figure begun to impose itself at that point —a character that 
took shape during the years preceding 1973 and whose entrance on the scene 
helped set the tone of the second Peronist era. Looking back at the forces 
rallied around Perón in 1973 we find more than the mere presence of his tra-
ditional supporters, i.e. the working class and more generally the masses. 
Behind Peronism's impressive electoral victory there were also large con-
tingents of middle-class sectors that has abandoned their former political 
loyalties to gather around Perón's return to power. I will here dwell on this 
transfer of middle-class allegiances in favor of Peronism. The shift was ex-
emplified by the role played by the Peronist youth in the years preceding the 
political events of 1973. Recruited among university and high-school students, 
the Peronist youth placed its hopes for political renewal in Perón, thus making 
a complete about-turn from what had been the traditional political views of the 
sectors of society to which they belonged. The magnitude of this change 
appears clearly once we recall that the whole of middle-class Argentina was 
against Peronism in 1955 and that at the time university stu- 
dents were the vanguard of a civilian opposition that contributed to the 
overthrow of the populist regime. We could say, roughly, that the children of 
those who had opposed Perón now turned their backs to their parents and 
embraced the very cause that the latter once resisted. Thus, whereas for the 
lower classes the return of Peronism meant the vindication of old political 
convictions, for the young newcomers to the movement it was a gesture of 
political parricide. I do not need to belabor the importance of this last drama 
that enveloped Argentina in a wave of violence for which it was hardly pre-
pared. The survival of Peronism among the laboring classes is comprehensi-
ble in the light of the social and political history of Argentina. In the forties 
Peronism presided over the incorporation of the workers into the political 
system and promoted their socio-economic advance. As is usually the case 
with the formation of new social movements, that early and crucial collective 
experience left its imprint in the collective memory and therefore in the poli-
tical consciousness of the Argentine working class; it was truly its birthmark. 
Despite their repeated attempts at coercion and/or cooptation, the regimes 
—civilian and military— that succeeded Peron's could not erase that primary 
political loyalty. In fact, the policies pursued by such regimes over the course 
of eighteen years served to confirm that loyalty. But how to account for the 
new youth movement that arose from the very core of middle-class 
Argentina, spread like a fire in the prairies, and progressively broke all ties 
with established political practices? What are the sources of this abstract (and 
violent) consciousness? 
Perhaps the best way to tackle the question is to take a few steps back 
and trace the roots of this unprecedented break. A glance over the map 
suggests that this violent form of radicalization appears in countries which, 
for quite dissimilar reasons, have experienced an uncontrolled social 
development, with the ensuing disequilibrium in the mechanisms of 
government. It is possible to attribute this deregulation to a general decline in 
capitalist rationality (exacerbated in dependent countries) in the West. In any 
event, for the specific case of Argentina, a historical, retrospective glance 
may be an antidote to perplexity and disquiet, and especially to the kind of 
exorcism through which people abdicate both understanding and 
responsibility. Indeed, many have seen the irruption of the radicalized youth 
in Argentine politics as a hurricane coming through the window of a peaceful 
home. The anger expressed by the youth, their 'abstract consciousness' has 
been treated as a sort of deus ex machina. Yet, despite such interpretations, 
we cannot deny that the attitudes and proposals displayed by the Peronist 
youth were intimately linked to the avatars of Argentine development over a 
long span of time. Going back to the fifties (the period when this youth was 
born) we observe that Argentina was undergoing a new wave of 
modernization affecting many institutions —among them education and the 
family— and resulting in the transformation of the cultural climate of the 
country. From 1940 to 1955, 
Argentina had lived culturally cloistered. The first Peronist era had spon-
sored a certain return to the 'autochtonous,' and had spurned the 'cosmo-
politanism' that had accompanied previous moments of growth. The demise of 
Perón's regime then opened the gates to the reception of contemporary trends 
and fashions. The middle class now eagerly embraced cultural practices and 
products that for long years they had been allowed to taste surreptitiously at 
best. The intellectuals that had been dislodged by the Peronist regime now 
devoted their efforts to update the circuits of production and consumption of 
knowledge, in an attempt sometimes to imitate, sometimes to catch up with, 
international standards of proficiency. Their project of cultural renovation 
coincided with the modernizing impulse promoted by such governments as 
Frondizi's administration, and which came to be known as desarrollismo. The 
wish to renovate culture seized the universities and radiated from them to the 
larger world of the middle-class. Literature and the arts received a new boost, 
while entirely new modes of inquiry and expression were explored and then 
rapidly diffused. Psychoanalysis (never exempt from an aura of chic 
voodooism) signified best the experience of these groups —as a novel 
curiosity, as a symbol of change, and as an attempt to come to terms with the 
consequences of that change. To grow up in such a climate meant, for the 
middle-class child of the fifties, to receive more fully the brunt of the new 
cultural trends, to face a wide set of choices, but also a more uncertain future, 
than any of his or her forebears. What needs to be added is that, like so many 
currents of reform in the Argentine past, the modernization that led this new 
generation into uncharted territories failed to encompass the whole society. 
Old traditions may have suffered serious setbacks, but they managed to 
survive, mixed with the new like oil mixes with water. Survivors and 
newcomers were thrown together in haste, geared for the dramatic 
confrontations that would rock the country later on. 
A second process to be noted in the late fifties is the disarticulation of po-
litical language that was taking place at the very heights of power. The 
political elites that at the time put forward the idea of development, found the 
formulas inherited from the past largely unusable. It was thus in the register of 
official discourse that the political effects of modernization were first 
inscribed. Old words received new meanings; terms belonging to disparate 
universes of discourse were transposed and combined; former antinomies 
were wedded and welded. A bizarre discursive bricolage accompanied a no 
less daring act of political combinazioni —an art in which the then president 
Frondizi excelled and for which he came, eventually, to be almost universally 
distrusted. For the desarrollista elites, 'liberation' was no longer incompatible 
with 'dependency.' Frondizi —who once wrote a nationalist tract on oil 
policy— felt free to announce that in order to rid the country of the tutelage of 
the imperialist Big Brother, he would grant generous concessions to several of 
the Big Sisters. Small wonder then that this perverse dialectic would later find 
a fateful echo 
among those who would advocate violence as a means to attain pacification: 
si vis pacem para bellum (as interpreted by la Joda). Such stretching exercises 
in political discourse puzzled an older generation of Argentines accustomed 
to hear the familiar sounds of separate ideologies. Frondizi (and those like 
him) introduced a new tension in the prevailing political style —a 
fundamental dissonance in the context of old cadences. Best intentions not-
withstanding, neither he nor those who succeeded him in the exercise of 
power provided a resolution, a satisfying synthesis. Far from it, political 
discourse in Argentina moved toward a dangerous freedom from all 
consonance, from the obligation to resolve the dissonance. Eventually, almost 
any combination of notes was to be admitted, and the country moved farther 
and farther away from releasing tension in rational ways. From this refusal of 
resolution came —ten years after Frondizi— the aptness of the discourse and 
style of the radicalized middle-class youth for the enactment of anguish and 
the macabre, as for example in General Aramburu's kidnapping, execution, 
and further kidnapping of the corpse. 
The precipitating factors just reviewed must be now placed in the wider 
context of global Argentine society, characterized by the weakness of social 
loyalties on the one hand, and by a protracted institutional crisis, on the other. 
In words that others may find more familiar or congenial, this process can 
also be described as the inability of any social class to gain ideological hege-
mony over society, and thus to assure its own legitimacy in the running of the 
state. These two features tend to reinforce each other and result in a vicious 
circle. Suffice it to say here that the rapid, inorganic development of Argen-
tina had put, side by side, groups that failed to speak the same political 
language or include others in their own universe of discourse. Given such 
dissonance of political voices, a heavy premium is placed on the distribution 
of resources, while social stability rests on the performance of institutions, on 
the reiteration of multiple pay-offs; in short, on the fragile capacity to 'deliver 
the goods.' Where hegemonic values cannot cement the social order, only the 
perspective of a simultaneous satisfaction of concrete interests keeps the 
whole together. Now it was precisely this capacity of institutions that began to 
falter after 1955, and in the following eighteen years the process eroded their 
credibility as places wherein to pursue meaningful lives, as platforms from 
which to have an input in national life. From the days of Frondizi, through the 
years of Onganía, to the return of Perón, political disorder and economic crisis 
played havoc with the demands of a new generation and its pursuit of self 
realization. The elders reacted to the general malaise by retreating to known 
and worn strategies of survival, to old political reflexes, to the narrow defense 
of their interests. They could afford to wait and see, or believed they could 
afford it. But what rational strategies, which reflexes could the middle-class 
youth fall back on? Only a leap forward into the void became available to 
many of them. Repeated frustrations bred in them con- 
tempt for what society had to offer. In that situation they begun blending the 
ingredients of a radical utopia. Whence the mythological treatment to which 
they subjected Peronist ideology at the very moment when the established 
political groups —more traditional Peronists included— sought a form of 
conciliation. No such fall-back on pragmatic accomodation was acceptable to 
the young. Cut from the past, greatly detached from both acquired interests 
and established values, the new generation refused all and every one of the 
existing political proposals. To those plans the Peronist youth opposed their 
own radical design —one that scarcely took into account the actual 
composition of political forces. They formulated their Great Refusal in a 
language that sought to recreate and echo the tone of earlier, allegedly heroic, 
epochs of Peronism. They exorcised the ghost of Evita as a champion of the 
uprooted and the excluded, and evoked anew the figure of her old noble 
descamisado. The middle-class youth's retreat to a mythical past served as a 
symbolic barricade against the prevailing climate of compromise in other 
sectors of society. Distant evocations sought to preserve conflict in the face of 
a present that marched, haphazardly but visibly, towards the resolution of 
former discrepancies. The radical theme thus became the "revolution be-
trayed." While Peronists saw the possibility of obtaining historic reparation, 
the Peronist youth perceived in that a loss of nerve that had to be ruthlessly 
combatted. Whilst the organized working class was being accepted again as 
part of the political system and found a place in it after eighteen years of 
proscription, the young preached revolution in the name of the outcasts. To 
conciliation they opposed rupture; to accomodation, a struggle without 
concessions; to the disorderly and pragmatic, even messy, present, a purified 
and redeeming past. Such language ultimately exploded the rationality of 
political discourse, fixed its fragments in mythical essences, and redistributed 
the pieces in unbridgeable dichotomies until violence became the predominant 
communication strategy. The middle class youth thus built an armed utopia 
with which it burst into the political arena, stunning the once-confident society 
that had nurtured it. 
Argentine society found itself without any political answer to meet the 
challenge. Puzzled, unable to respond, politicians and intellectuals took a step 
back to watch in despair the invasion of the main stage by those whose only 
way to face the insurgent youth was retribution, whose only language was 
counter-violence. Fascism now showed its horrible countenance and finally 
stole the show. Living through this drama has been additional hardship for an 
already exhausted country. This may explain why those who visit Argentina 
today, searching for the visible signs of agony, or for the ferment of 
resistance, are often struck instead by a widespread wish to forget, by a 
passion for ignorance among large sectors of the population. The 
acquiescence — and sometimes harrowing support for what goes on— among 
so many, is, in my view, deeply tied to an immediate past that is perceived as 
wounding, chaotic, and unredeemed. 
II 
Governance 
"El solo hecho de que los enemigos del 
peronismo sean quienes son nos parece un 
motivo mas que legítimo para defenderlo y 
valerse de él y un día, sabes, un día salir de él 
y tanta otra cosa por el único camino posible." 
Libro de Manuel, 262 
With the return of the military to the barracks after the formidable vic-
tory of the electoral front led by Perón in 1973, Argentina felt it had 
re-encountered at last its true political destiny. The wide consensus that de-
veloped called for leaving behind past apprehension and recent animosities. 
It crystallized in a formula for political coexistence that seemed to fit the 
image enjoyed by the country among its Latin American neighbors —that of 
a nation socially democratic and politically articulate. On the one hand, 
Peronists and Radicales, the two great national parties, fraternized in par-
liament; on the other, unions and entrepreneurs rallied around a concerted 
incomes policy. 
Backed by the indisputable electoral majority and holding the banner of 
coexistence, the old leader reentered the country. Thus culminated a tortuous 
struggle he had been waging since 1955 against those who now had to step 
aside and leave him the path open to power. But if this Perón whom 
Argentines received after a long absence seemed capable of synthesizing his 
shifts in strategy and seemed able to redefine, from his new position in 
power, policies which he had advocated from the opposition, could the same 
flexibility be expected from his own movement? That movement had grown, 
over the course of eighteen years, as a contesting force that was hardly com-
mitted to a political order which had persistently curtailed its participation. 
How then impress the necessity of political coincidence upon those in whom 
repeated proscriptions had instilled an acute consciousness of difference? 
How to persuade those who had seen the relentless diminution of their share 
in income distribution that it was prudent to make the demands of labor com-
patible with the general stability of the economy? Finally, how to obtain 
peace from those whose violence had been previously exalted? The vast 
popular movement which Perón's return convoked could barely hide a 
temptation for intransigence, the thrust of accumulated dissatisfactions, 
behind its proclaimed loyalty to the leader. In fact, the old caudillo's calls for 
conciliation found a more favorable reception among his adversaries than 
among his 
followers. The former saw Perón's message as a promise of political order, 
while the latter preferred instead to listen to their own claims for political 
reparation. The political enterprise inaugurated in 1973 thus encountered its 
first obstacle in the breach between the spirit of conviviality animating Perón's 
return and the mood behind the popular mobilization that carried him back to 
the government. In order to bridge this gap, Perón would invest all the 
reserves of his charisma, which the distance of exile had preserved intact from 
the deterioration that by 1973 compromised the prospects of institutions. This 
reference to the state of the political system also throws light on another 
obstacle confronting the political design with which the old leader came back 
to the political scene. 
The decision to open up the political game, taken by the military in 1972 
after arduous negotiations with Perón, who was then in Madrid, sought to 
foreswear the menace that emerging forces and conflicts in civil society might 
largely overflow the traditional brim of politics. The wave of regional 
rebellions following the Cordobazo of 1969, the outbreak of multiple wild-cat 
strikes in factories, the spread of urban and rural guerrillas were developments 
that favored, within the armed forces, the ascendancy of officers like Lanusse, 
who counseled the need for an urgent political way out. Thus, political 
institutions were suddenly convened to discipline the social struggle. But they 
had to be taken out of the closets where they had been kept in disrepair. The 
summons found those institutions with their structures in disarray, 
questionable and unrepresentative. The political parties and the trade unions 
that the Lanusse administration first rehabilitated, and that Perón subsequently 
invested with new prestige under his proposal for an 'integrated democracy,' 
had not withstood undamaged the onslaught of interdictions and punishments 
to which they had been subjected under the authoritarian rule of General 
Ongania, from 1966 to 1970. Now that they left their forced passivity behind 
in order to sit at the table of negotiations, could they hope to retrieve the 
amount of social power that, since the Cordobazo, had been accumulating on 
their side and which remained in the periphery of institutions as a political 
residue intractable to compromise? Such was the ominous question hanging 
over political institutionism, cautioning the prospects of the political project 
that sought precisely to grow and consolidate itself around them. 
Thus, for such enterprise to succeed Perón had, on the one hand, to 
channel the diffuse and virulent expectations of his followers, and on the 
other, to rebuild the battered political system. A curious paradox of history : 
he who once had been identified with one half of the country now came to be 
everything for everybody. The same man who had applied his remarkable 
skills to sabotage many a government was now called to the rescue of a 
drifting polity. At stake in 1973 was the very governability of the country. To 
such endeavor Perón devoted his remaining energies in his remaining days. 
The 
scene of Perón s last battle —to me, symbolic of Argentine politics as a 
whole — would not be filled with the familiar cast of characters of 
yesteryear. He did not find himself leading a popular movement against 
established society. After the collapse of the Gran Acuerdo Nacional 
launched by General Lanusse, and with the Peronist triumph at the polls, the 
military and economic elites were in full political retreat. Thus, instead of 
confronting a strong social opposition, the old populist leader faced the 
harder task of taming the furies loosened by eighteen years of discord. 
Bearing in mind this last image, Perón's return to the presidency and the 
retreat of his opponents have been interpreted as parts of a strategy, as 
cunning maneuvers on the part of the military, who would presumably wait 
on the wings for Perón's efforts to fail in order to end, once and for all, his 
political ascendancy and to stage their own comeback to power. This con-
spiratorial hypothesis was no more than a rationalization introduced after the 
resounding defeat of 1973. In spite of its seeming confirmation by later 
events, it remains an argument of the type post hoc, ergo propter hoc. In 
actual fact, in 1973 everybody placed their bets: the military regime sought to 
negotiate its own succession, and Perón offered himself as an alternative. 
Profiting from the lack of political credibility of the armed forces, after al-
most six years of an erratic exercise of power, and displaying his own 
political talent, Perón won the match, isolating his rivals and forcing them to 
grant elections unburdened by onerous conditions. Besides, an additional 
argument against the conspiratorial hypothesis is that the transfer of power to 
Perón created a situation so unforeseeable that it is hard to imagine a strategy 
that could count upon such risks. One may know how to start a war, but not 
how to end it. It was precisely with this uncertainty about the future that the 
military handed power over to the man whom they had fought for so long, 
and they left the scene. 
The weakness of the outgoing regime was not supplanted by the strength 
of the incoming government. The skills applied by Perón to disband his ad-
versaries proved themselves insufficient to build a viable political alternative. 
The populist leader could not dissociate himself from the network on social 
and political arrangements that he had promoted. Everything rested on his 
shoulders to the point where he became, old and ailing, a system of politics 
by himself. Every group came to define its own position in terms of its 
relative access to the presumed will of the leader, and to couch its designs in 
terms of his political discourse. When a political system that transcribes 
autonomous social relations is substituted by a personalized system of poli-
tics, when society is expropriated, as it were, by politics, and politics is em-
bodied in one man, then social actors enter a symbolic universe characterized 
by the absolute primacy of interpretation. This situation gave rise to the 
bizarre atmosphere of "political hermeneutics" that enveloped Argentina 
during much of this period. Every act of the leader carried a fateful 
meaning; every one of his utterances had to be deciphered. Driven to interpret, 
struggling over the words of the Argentine imam, every group in post-1973 
Argentina strove to relate its actions to the expression of the subtle, shifting 
will of Perón. The compulsion to make their positions appear as 
manifestations of Perón's own was so deeply engrained that when he sought to 
repudiate the most extreme interpretations of his statements —notably those 
of the radicalized youth— the latter countered with the argument that the 
aging leader was surrounded and misled by a gang of evil advisers. 
As Perón's politics became all inclusive, as it incorporated antagonistic 
forces within itself, social conflict got entangled in struggles over the appro-
priation of his discourse. Side by side with traditional social oppositions, other 
ones developed which complicated and confused the terms. The fight against 
Perón's entourage was put on the same level as opposition to big business; the 
war against the dissident youth was carried out with the same zeal as the 
demobilization of the masses. Political life thus came to be like a vast, 
increasingly tense, ballo in maschera in which the masks, though hiding deep 
antagonisms, oddly resembled one another, for they were all patterned after 
the effigy of Perón. Political transvestism became the norm. Propelled by the 
state of mobilization which embraced the entire country, fueled by the old and 
the new taste for violence cultivated within the Peronist movement, the social 
conflicts and the political struggles largely exceeded Perón's capacity to steer 
and contain them. They seized his language and stretched it to unimaginable 
extremes of disparate interpretations; they put his leadership to a severe test 
by blocking his decisions, and all was done in his name, with his words. On 
June 12th 1974, one month before his death, Perón went to the scene of his 
past triumphs for the last time, to the balcony of the Casa Rosada, and 
threatened to resign, in an effort to regain political initiative over a society 
that has slipped away from his command. 
With Perón's death, Argentina accelerated its pace towards political 
devastation. The countdown had begun, and nothing would stop deterioration. 
Perón had been unable to instill political institutions with a life of their own. 
Instead, he held the country together by virtue of his charisma. But charisma 
cannot be transferred. Missing a core, even a fictive point of reference, the 
precarious institutional arrangements collapsed like a house of cards. Brutally 
decentered, Argentina became like Lichtemberg's knife, which was missing 
the blade and lacked a handle. Between the missing blade and the absent 
handle, Argentines could only face the void. Whereas Perón had tried to be 
alert and responsive to pressures from below, those who inherited his 
administration busied themselves with secret conspiracies and florentine 
intrigues, and indulged in unspeakable practices and unnatural political acts. 
Isabel's close circle became remote from a political society that had lost all 
regulation, and which was abandoning itself to an orgy of anomie. The 
entrepreneurs' search for profit degenerated into an economy of sacking 
and plunder, the trade unions responded by pushing for enormous demands, 
the arcane manipulations of the presidential clique gave a tone of unreality to 
political life. While existing social compacts and political understandings 
were blown up to bits, people themselves begun to be blown up too with de-
pressing regularity. But despite the expansion of violence, conflict did not 
issue in an open civil war. The efforts of the contending groups to involve 
large sectors of the population in their crusades did not have the expected 
success. Against a background of sordid struggles between armed camps, the 
established social groups preferred to continue their own bickering, trying to 
save their respective skins in the face of impending disaster. The 
eleventh-hour attempts to find a way out failed because of the Peronists' 
sectarianism and because of the Radicales' civil retreat. In the end, and with 
the painful sight of wasted hope before them, there was nothing left to the 
majority of Argentines but to await the return of the military. 
III 
Patterns of Change 
"Claro que mi país es un puro refrito, hay 
que decirlo con todo cariño." Rayuela, 115 
Argentina lurches forward, then stops; it jerks ahead; it makes convulsive 
advances in time. Each movement forward is pulled back toward the starting 
point. The history of that country has been patterned by the perpetual 
recurrence of movements of restoration, and by inconclusive revolutions of all 
sorts. Such ups and downs are the counterpart of a society in which change 
did not take place through the progressive incorporation of new actors and 
practices within an ongoing socio-economic order. As in many other Latin 
American societies, here too the process of change entailed both the 
maintenance of old sectors and the creation of new ones. With the end of the 
prosperous society based on agrarian exports, a new industrial structure grew, 
and when it faltered in turn, modern enclaves of growth developed around 
multinational investments. As with the accretion of strata in the history of a 
geological formation, none of these societal forms managed to displace the 
others entirely. The old and the new remained juxtaposed in odd coexistence. 
Neither this pattern of change by accretion nor the resulting fragmented, 
disarticulated society are unique features of Argentina. It is a pattern 
constitutive of dependent social structures. The peculiarity of Argentina lies 
rather in the fact that each of the successive societal forms was able to give 
rise to a dense network of interests and to a deeply entrenched mode of life 
that vigorously persist beyond their apogee. During the prosperity enjoyed by 
Argentina under the agrarian order, a dynamic urban society flourished that 
housed the most "advanced" middle sectors in Latin America at the time. 
Literacy then attained levels hitherto unknown in the sub-continent, while 
secular ways of association went hand in hand with liberal ideas, shaping city 
and nation until World War II. The industrial development that started in the 
thirties opened the path for a new social actor —a powerful labor movement, 
the strength of which derived from the absence of large labor reserves and 
from the protection of the State. Unionization was fast and thorough. The 
irruption of organized labor provoked a dramatic extension of political 
participation, and from then on, the presence of the working class in politics 
could never again be dismissed. The productive and technological moderni-
zation that took place since the late fifties remained encapsulated in industrial 
poles and lacked the extensive social impact of the previous societal forms. 
Nevertheless it contributed to the formation of a managerial elite wedded to 
foreign capital and of decisive weight on national economic policies. Effi-
ciency and growth became the catchwords of this sector as it, in turn, sought 
to modulate the destiny of the country. 
The history of Argentina has thus resulted in a fragmented mosaic of 
groups juxtaposed in uneasy, crowded collection. Each sector of society forms 
a strong cluster of interests and is firmly anchored in a set of institutions. 
Because each of these sectors is highly mobilized, it can defend its particular 
interests in an articulate manner against the others. The landed upper class 
both shaped and occupied a series of public and private strongholds from 
which it increased its wealth and exercised its influence. The middle classes 
used the educational institutions to lodge themselves in the professions and in 
the administration. Workers defended their salaries and their rights with 
strong unions. Monopoly capital found its own bulwarks, with internal and 
external linkages. Everybody busily promotes his own projects, peddles his 
own interest, speaks his own language. But no vision arises that proves large 
enough to reach out to the others, sedimented enough to seek hegemony. The 
center remains forever elusive; no one finds a common ground. In this 
volatile, active, articulate society alliances, like fireworks, are as varied and 
colorful as they are ephemeral. Political fragility becomes the counterpart of 
all the hustle and the bustle of an activist society. There are too many 
landlords for too many workers, too many shopkeepers for too many entre-
preneurs — the excess resulting from each and every actor being deeply 
entrenched and rapidly mobilized. To the observer, this sort of negative 
pluralism poses a fundamental problem of societal coexistence, a Hobbesian 
conundrum of order, a tension that seeks but cannot find, an adequate political 
resolution. Expectations are periodically directed towards the State to bring 
remedy and repair, to warrant order and to unify a fragmented general will 
—to forge, in short, a single system from the disparate groups. 
Yet, contrary to these expectations, state power does not seem to grow in 
Argentina at the expense of the competing institutions. Time and again the 
State does rise above the turmoil and seeks to assume the agency of this 
erratic historicity. But each time it seems to falter, to rapidly lose force, and 
then succumb to the tug-of-war between actors that cannot themselves rise to 
the level of social movements and that remain, strictly speaking, mere 
pressure groups. Thus no power appears great enough to unify the whole 
society. Too weak to lead, each group is still strong enough to prevent any 
other from doing so. Hence, though once intellectually brilliant and culturally 
creative, more emancipated than many other societies from the trammels of 
traditional authority, Argentina easily falls prey to political decay. The State 
tends to rapidly lose whatever autonomy it may have attained vis-à-vis civil 
society and to become instrumentalized, not by a ruling class —as current 
opinion would have us believe — but by a larger plurality of narrow groups. 
Things then return to where they started, namely, to the erratic behavior of a 
malfunctioning political system. 
A political system that malfunctions is one that functions purely as a 
market. For political institutions to work best, they must neither be the simple 
translation of social interests nor a totally autonomous sphere. Between these 
two extremes, a political system is that space where negotiations can take 
place, where alternance is defined by rules, where change is institutionalized. 
To be viable such system requires a common framework of discussion — 
something more than a motley assortment of cogs and pulleys that each group 
manipulates to its own profit and pleasure, something more than a spoils 
system. But what the State has been unable to guarantee from above, civil 
society in Argentina has been incapable of supplying from below. Instead of 
generally accepted rules (even under conditions of ideological hegemony by 
one class) we find mere pulsions; in lieu of political transactions we find a 
crazy quiltwork of deals. A tendency develops to exaggerate the importance 
of the political game for its own sake, and to minimize the purposes for which 
the game is ultimately played, to lose sight of larger societal stakes. 
Whenever the state formulates something resembling a national project, it 
meets derision. In a situation in which everybody knows all too well what he 
wants and appears capable of the shrewdest insight into the intricacies of the 
opponent, the most pathetic of all actors is the one who ventures a general 
project for the nation. Where there is no largeness of aim, no breadth of po-
litical conception, only partial answers to blockage and reciprocal vetoes 
occupy the center of the stage. Just as each group rushes to defend its parti-
cular interests and to prevent competing moves on the part of its adversaries, 
so each group clads its demands in an autonomous discourse. What results is 
not a debate, let alone articulate class conflict, but a dissonance of inde-
pendent notes played either together or in haphazard sequence, as in Fellini's 
Prova d'Orchestra. The landed oligarchy —and to a large extent the middle 
classes— speak the language of order; the workers, the language of parti-
cipation; the industrialists and technocrats, the language of growth and ef-
ficiency. The loudness of the parts only increases the cacophony of the whole. 
The society then does not make sense to itself and cannot interpret its position 
in the world scene. Viewed from the outside, Argentine society does not seem 
to find a sure —and certainly not a decent— place within a changing 
international order. Uncertain about itself, it drifts, it slides, it is pushed 
further to the margins. From within, it behaves spasmodically and seems to 
lack focus, not because there is a vacuum of power but because power is 
everywhere, dispersed in explosive quanta throughout the social body. 
Argentina puzzles and brings despair to those who expect a country 
literate, urbanized, well fed, to house a free, self-governing people. It also 
frustrates those who, faute de mieux, seem to detect in a modern "efficient" 
form of despotism the remedy to disunion and license. Finally, it also frus-
trates those who would like to see a truly revolutionary alternative emerge, 
with lines of consciousness and organization clearly drawn. But no democracy 
ever appears, only disorder; no solid authoritarian state, but mere military 
regimes haunted by their lack of legitimacy and by their crimes; no revolu-
tionary situation, but terrorism. A society that once was full of promise and is 
still young in years has entered a fateful spiral of decay that sometimes seizes 
much older nations. But in the latter, the strength of traditions, the respect for 
weathered and tested institutions, the commonality of belief, makes decadence 
supportable, and sometimes even genteel. For Argentina, decadence is hell. 
Without the appropriate resources to muddle through in an unsteady world, 
lacking the habits of conviviality on which to fall back and repose, the country 
declines, frenetically, tormented by the image of a past for whose 
disappearance no consolation seems possible. This vocation for nostalgia has 
received a severe blow with Perón's death and the subsequent débacle. The 
coming years will show if the Argentines are ready to face the challenge of 
looking towards the future, and not only to the past —mediate or immediate— 
when dealing with the anxieties of the present. Modern Argentina was 
actually born in 1880. It looks old today, and it is sinking fast as it has reached 
the centennial. It remains to be seen whether it will renew itself or stay 
instead, mesmerized in articulo mortis. 
IV 
Order 
"Well it's blues in my house from the roof to the 
ground." 
Rayuela, 524 
Civil society was ill behaved. Now its pathology from below has been 
sealed by a coup de grace from above. After 1976, the principal feature of the 
authoritarian process that has taken over Argentine life would seem to be the 
conversion of the previous (and as we have seen chaotic) socio-political 
discourse into a state-political discourse in which everything is reduced to a 
simple dichotomy: the paradigm friend/foe. In political theory, the most 
dramatic formulation of such reduction can be found in an old text from 1927, 
authored by Carl Schmitt, and which bears the innocuous title Der Begriff des 
politischen. It was not so innocuous. The author later became the self-appointed 
theoretician of German National Socialism. I mention that text because I find in 
it the most cogent spelling-out of the somber "logic" of authoritarian situations. 
For a sociologist, the question that matters pertains to the legitimation of such 
reduction when it happens, in other words, under what conditions and on the 
basis of which prior experience does a population, or a sector thereof, "buy" 
such drastic impoverishment of its civil existence. Political scientists have 
focused primarily on the resistances to such reduction on the level of the 
political system and its structural guarantees against such slippage. Sociologists, 
on the other hand, seek an answer in the institutional arrangements, group 
processes, and values that allow or impeded, as the case might be, the re-coding 
of civil relations into a pure state logic, that is, the patterning of all social 
(intra-societal) relations after the friend/foe (inter-societal) paradigm. 
The present regime in Argentina seeks to legitimate itself by embedding its 
version of the friend/foe paradigm within a larger paradigm of chaos/order, 
according to this scheme: 
 
The logic is exclusively past-oriented and exclusively negative. It is in fact, a 
rhetoric of remembrance and avoidance. It consists in telling people that the 
abuses of present order are preferable to the wounds and chaos of the im-
mediate past. It trades organized repression and administered brutality for past 
sins and violence. As such, it seeks —and to a surprising degree succeeds— to 
paralyze the critical will. Its model is simple. It includes three actors as a 
minimal set: a source of punishment, a victim, and a target. The victim 
perishes or disappears from circulation, but the target reacts to the news of 
that destruction with some manner of submission or accommodation, that is, 
by inhibiting his or her potential resistance. An expanded model includes a 
division of labor in the source of punishment (a terror staff, internally 
organized into a directorate of violence and goon squads). The selection of 
victims can be random or from specific social categories. They are regularly 
selected, and dispatched with variable rates of destruction. The terror process 
is continuous or discontinuous, depending on the circumstances, its patterns 
are of varying intensity, the victims are selected by specialized services, or 
sometimes by potential victims themselves. In some cases the population is 
made into an accomplice of the very acts perpetrated against it. There is no 
surprise in this model; its blueprints have been tried time and again in our 
glorious century. The striking characteristic of the Argentine version is the 
duplicity with which it has been handled. The Janus-face of Argentine terror 
appears on several levels, from governmental disavowal and refusal of 
accountability, to a split structure of discourse and consciousness among 
significant sectors of the population. 
On the level of official ideology and propaganda, the operating meta-
phors of law and order are medical, and more precisely surgical. This cor-
responds to a self-presentation of the regime as punishing definite acts of 
subversion and breaking up organizations suspected of sedition. Behind this 
manifest discourse structured around metaphors of illness and cure, there is 
another text, another discourse, not verbalized by those in power and re-
pressed by different sectors of the population, which corresponds to the terror 
process itself, and for which medical images are not adequate. The missing 
metaphor is that of a chemical procedure, or more precisely, that of corrosion. 
As independent social networks dissolve in this "chemical" medium of fear, 
the first steps towards resistance are inhibited. Only those groups that can 
insulate themselves in some specific manner maintain a critical capacity 
(which is a normal capacity of non-terroristic systems). And they will be, 
most likely, those groups which no longer look upon the immediate past 
chronicled in this paper as a threat, or merely as a chaos to which everything 
is preferable. Behind the text of order there is the text of fear, but behind them 
both there is the solider text of a real class struggle, which will be written, and 
rewritten, in the end. 
